Abstract. In this paper, we describe new results on the security, in the Luby-Rackoff paradigm, of two modified Feistel constructions, namely the L-scheme, a construction used at various levels of the MISTY blockcipher which allows to derive a 2n-bit permutation from several n-bit permutations, and a slightly different construction named the R-scheme. We obtain pseudorandomness and super-pseudorandomness proofs for Lschemes and R-schemes with a sufficient number of rounds, which extend the pseudorandomness and non superpseudorandomness results on the 4-round L-scheme previously established by Sugita [Su96] and Sakurai et al. [Sa97] . In particular, we show that unlike the 3-round L-scheme, the 3-round R-scheme is pseudorandom, and that both the 5-round L scheme and the 5-round R scheme are super pseudorandom (whereas the 4 round versions of both schemes are not super pseudorandom). The security bounds obtained here are close to those established by Luby and Rackoff for the three round version of the original Feistel scheme.
Introduction
A key dependent cryptographic function such as a blockcipher can be viewed as a random function associated with a randomly selected key value. It is generally defined using a recursive construction process. Each step of the recursion consists of deriving a random function (or permutation) f from r previously defined random functions (or permutations) f 1 , .., f r , and can be represented by a relation of the form f = Φ(f 1 , .., f r ). The most studied example so far is the f = Ψ (f 1 , .., f r ) r-round Feistel construction, which allows to derive a 2n-bit to 2n-bit random permutation from r n-bit to n-bit functions. But there exist other well known constructions such as for instance Massey and Lai's alternative to the Feistel scheme used in IDEA [La90] and the constructions allowing to deduce a 2n-bit permutation from several n-bit permutations used in Matsui's MISTY blockcipher [Ma93] .
The strongest security requirement one can put on a f random function or permutation representing a key dependent cryptographic function is (informally speaking) that f be undistinguishable with a non negligible success probability from a perfect random function f * or permutation c * , even if a probabilistic testing algorithm A of unlimited power is used for that purpose and if the q number of adaptively chosen queries of A to the random instance of f or f * to be tested is large.
It is generally not possible to prove undistiguishability properties for "real life" cryptologic random function f and large q numbers of queries, because this would require a far too long key length. However, it is often possible to prove or disprove that if a random function f encountered at a given level of a cryptologic function construction is related to random functions encountered at the lower recursion level by a relation of the form f = Φ(f 1 , .., f r ), then if we replace the actual f 1 to f r random functions of the cipher by independent perfect random functions or permutations f * 3 from a 2n-bit perfect random permutation c * with q adaptively chosen queries to the tested instance of f or f * . This advantage is bounded over by q 2 2 n . The research on pseudorandomness properties of cryptographic constructions initiated Luby and Rackoff's seminal paper [Lu88] has represented a very active research study for the last decade. Just to mention a few examples, Zheng, Matsumoto and Imai and later on Sugita and Sakurai et al. investigated generalised Feistel constructions [Zh89] , [Su96] , [Su97] , Patarin explicited the link between the best advantage of a q-queries distinguisher and the q-ary transition probabilities associated with f and proved undistinguihability bounds for numerous r-round Feistel constructions [Pa91] , Maurer showed how to generalise undistinguishability results related to perfect random functions to undistinguishability results related to nearly perfect random functions (e.g. locally random functions) [Ma92] , Bellare, Kilian, Rogaway et al. [Be94] investigated the application of similar techniques to modes of operation such as CBC MACs, Aiello and al. proved undistiguihability results on some parallelizable alternatives to the Feistel construction [Ai96] , Vaudenay embedded techniques for deriving undistinguishability bounds into a broader framework he named the decorrelation theory, and applied bounds provided by decorrelation techniques to proving the resistance of actual ciphers, e.g. DFC, against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
In this paper, we describe new results on the security of some blockcipher constructions in the above described paradigm, i.e. we investigate some f = Φ(f 1 , .., f k ) constructions and upper bound the probability of distinguishing f from a perfect random function when Φ is applied to perfect random functions f construction is used for instance at various levels of the construction of Matsui and al. Misty blockcipher [Ma93] , as well as in the Kasumi variant of Misty recently adopted as the standard blockcipher for encryption and integrity protection in third generation mobile systems [Ka] . We obtain pseudorandomness and superpseudorandomness proofs for L-scheme and R-scheme constructions with a sufficient number of rounds, which extend the results on the pseudo randomness of the 4-round L-scheme previously established by Sugita [Su96] and Sakurai et al. [Sa97] . In particular, we show that unlike the 3-round L scheme, the 3-round R scheme is pseudorandom, and that both the 5-round L scheme and the 5-round R scheme are super pseudorandom (whereas the 4 round versions of both schemes are not super pseudorandom).
This paper organised as follows: Section 2 introduces basic definitions and useful general results on random functions and techniques for proving that two random functions are undistiguishable. Section 3 describes the R and L schemes. Sections 4 and 5 present our results on the pseudo-randomness and the superpseudorandomness of the L-scheme and the R-scheme respectively, for various numbers of rounds, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Notation
Through this paper we are using the following notation: I n denotes the {0, 1} n . F n denotes the F n,n set: thus |F n | = 2 n.2 n . P n denotes the set of permutations on I n : thus |P n | = 2 n !.
Random Functions
A random function of F n,m is defined as a random variable f of F n,m , and can be viewed as a probability distribution (P r[f = ϕ]) ϕ∈Fn,m over F n,m , or equivalently as a (f ω ) ω∈Ω family of F n,m elements. In particular:
-A n-bit to m-bit key dependent cryptographic function is determined by a randomly selected key value K ∈ K, and can thus be represented by the random function 
In the sequel we will use the following simple properties: 
Property 3 Let c * be a perfect random permutation on I n . If x and x are two distinct elements of I n and δ is a given value of I n then Pr[c
Distinguishing Two Random Functions
In proofs of security such as the one presented here, we want to upper bound the probability of any algorithm to distinguish whether a given fixed function ϕ is an instance of a random function f = Φ(f * 1 , f * 2 , .., f * r ) of F n,m or an instance of the perfect random function f * , using less thanueries to ϕ. Let A be any distinguishing algorithm of unlimited power that, when input with a function ϕ of F n,m (which can be modeled as an " oracle tape " in the probabilistic Turing Machine associated with A) selects a fixed number q of distinct chosen or adaptively chosen input values X i (the queries), obtains the q corresponding output values Y i = f (X i ), and based on these results outputs 0 or 1. Denote by p (resp by p * ) the probability for A to answer 1 when fed with a random instance of f (resp of f * ). We want to find upper bounds on the 
then for any A distinguishing usingueries
In order to improve the selfreadability of this paper, a short proof of Theorem 1 is provided in appendix at the end of this paper.
Description of the L-and R-Schemes
We now describe two simple variants of the Feistel scheme, that we propose to name L-scheme and R-scheme, following the terminology proposed by Kaneko and al. in their paper on the provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis of generalised Feistel ciphers [Ka97] .
The L-scheme and R-scheme both allow to derive a 2n-bit to 2n-bit permutation from several n-bit to n bit permutations (not only n-bit to n-bit functions as in the Feistel scheme), using only one n-bit to n bit permutation per round.
The 1-round L-scheme is depicted in Figure 1 . It transforms a c 1 permutation
The extension to r rounds is straightforward: the r-round L-scheme transforms r I n permutations c 1 to c r into the I 2n permutation defined by
The L-scheme is used at several levels of the construction of the MISTY and KASUMI ciphers, namely the derivation of the so-called FI and FO functions, and also the upper level of the construction in the case of MISTY2. One remarkable feature of the r-round L-scheme is that two c i permutations can be processed in paralell.
The 1-round R-scheme is depicted in Figure 1 too. It transforms a c1 permutation of I n into the ψ R (c 1 ) permutation of I 2n defined by
The r-round R-scheme transforms r I n permutations c 1 to c r into the I 2n permutation defined by In the sequel, we will several times consider the slightly simplified versions
.., c r ) and ψ R (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c r ) obtained by omitting the XOR operation and the exchange of the left and right halves in the final round. We will sometimes analyse such simplified variants, whose pseudorandomness properties are obviously the same as those of the full r-round L or R scheme from which they are derived, instead of the full r-round L or R scheme, in order to simplify some discussions. We can notice that the ψ R (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c r ) and ψ L (c −1
1 ) permutations are inverse of each other. This remark will be useful when it comes to analysing the super pseudorandomness properties of the L and R schemes.
Through the two next Sections, especially in proofs, we are using the following additional notation:
-I is an abreviation for the (I n ) q set.
= denotes the subset of (I n ) q consisting of all the q-tuples of pairwise distinct I n values and
The exact definition of Y will vary. This Y will be redefined in each Section where this notation is needed.
Analysis of the L-Scheme
In this Section, we compare, for various values of the r number of rounds of an L-scheme, the f = ψ L (c * 
) Is a Pseudo-Random Function
As already established by Sakurai et al. [Sa97] , the four-round version of the L-scheme is indistinguishable from a perfect pseudo-random function. In order for this paper to provide a self contained summary of the properties of the L and R schemes inside the security framework introduced in Section 2, we restate this result as follows. 
A short proof for Theorem 2 is provided in appendix at the end of this paper. Since the proof technique is rather similar to the one used in the more detailed proof of Theorem 5 on the pseudorandomness of the 3-round R-scheme, we omitted some details in the proof of Theorem 2. → Y ] and then apply Theorem 4 above. We are using the notation
..q to refer to the q-tuples of I n intermediate words induced by the q considered f computations, at the locations marked in Figure 2 . 
Let us consider any fixed x 2 , x 3 q-tuples of I = . In order to establish a lower bound on the
] factor in (2), we define the following set Z of x 4 q-tuples:
where x 4 ∼ y 1 means that ∀i, j x 
4 values such that x 4 ∼ y 1 (as a matter of fact such an x 4 is entirely determined by q 1 distinct values). Now: j cannot be equal to y
Similary, using the fact that x 
due to Property 2 and the fact that the x 2 i and the
for the same reasons, so that:
If we now come back to inequality (2), we thus have:
Let us now establish a lower bound on
and it is easy to establish (using the fact that (x 
2 n (ii) . Now, by combinig (i) and (ii), we obtain:
We can now apply Theorem 4 with = 4q 2 2 n and we obtain:
Analysis of the R-Scheme
In this Section, we compare, for various values of the r number of rounds of an R-scheme, the f = ψ R (c * 1 , c * 2 , ..., c * r ) 2n-bit random permutation deduced from r independent perfect random n-bit permutations c * 1 , c * 2 , ..., c * r with a perfect 2n-bit function f * .
Three-Round R-Scheme
We first establish the following theorem for a 3-round version of the R-scheme. 
Theorem 5 Let
We now define X as the set of X q-tuples of pairwise distinct I 2n words (i.e. such that for any distinct i,j numbers in [1. 
We want to establish a lower bound on the size of Y and the Pr[X f → Y ] transition probability associated with any X q-tuple in X and any Y q-tuple in Y and show that there exists 1 and 2 real numbers satisfying conditions of Theorem 1.
Let us first establish a lower bound on |Y|. We have:
So, we can take 1 =
2 n . Now, given any X q-tuple of X and any Y q-tuple of Y let us establish a lower bound on
First, for any x 2 q-tuple of I = and any x 3 q-tuple of I = , let us compute
. Since x 2 and y 0 both belong to I = , we can can apply Property 2 of Section 2 concerning random permutations, so that Pr[(c *
. Therefore, inequality (2) implies: 
2 n . Applying this property to the
2 n . Thus:
By using inequalities (i) and (ii), we obtain:
We can notice that P r[X |I n | . We obtain: The above test allows to distinguish f from a perfect random permutation of I 2n with a probability close to 1. 
Five
Conclusion
As a consequence of previous results, the security properties of the L-scheme and the R-scheme are distinct when it comes to chosen plaintext attacks, but equivalent when it comes to chosen plaintext or ciphertext attacks. As a matter of fact, the minimal number of rounds required in order of the R-scheme to be undistinguishable from a pseudorandom function with adaptively chosen encryption queries is less than for the L-scheme (3 rounds instead of 4), whereas the minimal numbers of rounds required by the R-scheme and the L-scheme in order to be undistinguishable from a pseudorandom permutation with adaptively chosen encryption or decryption queries are equal (5 rounds for both schemes).
A Appendix
A.1 A Short Proof of Theorem 1
Let us restrict ourselves to the case of any fixed deterministic algorithm A which uses q adaptively chosen queries (the generalisation to the case of a probabilistic algorithm is easy). We have (for more details, see section 5. 
We have:
We can notice that P r[X 
